Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 12
Issue 2 Issue 2 - March 1959

Article 2

3-1959

The Duty to Warn Allergic Users of Products
Dix W. Noel

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Dix W. Noel, The Duty to Warn Allergic Users of Products, 12 Vanderbilt Law Review 331 (1959)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol12/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information,
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

THE DUTY TO WARN ALLERGIC USERS OF PRODUCTS
DIX W. NOEL*

There has been much recent development of the law in the field of
products liability, and one of the more significant aspects of this development relates to harm suffered by allergic users of cosmetics, dyed
clothing, and other familiar products. The medical descriptions of
allergy are complicated and changing, but from a legal standpoint the
significant factor is that an allergic reaction is one suffered by only a
minority of the persons exposed to a particular substance. A description which brings out this factor is one which defines allergy or hypersensitivity as "the condition or state of an individual who reacts
specifically and with unusual symptoms to the administration of, or
contact with, a substance which when given in similar amounts to
the majority of all other individuals proves harmless or innocuous."'
During the past few years a number of significant cases involving
injuries to allergic consumers have been decided, and the principal
issue has been whether or not there was an actionable failure to warn,
the allergic consumer. An attempt will be made to determine when
this duty to warn arises and the nature of the warning which must be
given. Consideration will be given to situations where the failure to
warn is regarded as negligence and also to cases where the failure is
considered to be a breach of warranty.
The two most recent cases in the field seem definitely to enlarge the
scope of the duty to warn. The latest of these decisions, Braun v.
Roux Distrib. Co., 2 involved injuries claimed to have been caused by
hair dye. Suit was brought on negligence grounds against the defend* Professor of Law, University of Tennessee.
1. Medico-Legal Aspects of Allergies, discussion by William A. Nelson,

M. D., 24 TENN. L. REv. 840 (1957). A more technical definition of allergy is
as follows: "Any specifically acquired alteration in the capacity of living
tissue to react. This alteration in capacity to react results from exposure to an
exciting agent and is manifested on re-exposure to the same or to an immunologically related agent." HANSEL, CLICAL ALLERGY 18 (1953). In a recent
article, Schmidt, Some Medical Terms Defined for the Layman, in HoUTS,
COURTROOM MEDICINE 376, 377 (1958), it is stated that the substances to which
the sensitivity is manifested may be almost anything, but that most often they
are pollens, plants, hair, cosmetics, or drugs. These offending substances,
known as allergens, often may be detected by a patch test.
It appears that no one is allergic to a substance to which he is exposed for
the first time, and that every allergy requires a period of incubation or sensitization. After sensitization, the allergic reactions may be divided into two
groups: (1) Those which develop shortly after Te-exposure to the offender, a
group which includes hay fever, asthma, and urticaria or hives; and (2) those

which develop slowly within 24 to 48 hours after re-exposure, such as contactdermatitis and other skin diseases. Samter, Allergy, in HoUTS, COURTROOM
MEDICINE 40 (1958).
2. 312 S.W. 2d 758 (Mo. 1958), 36 U. DET. L.J. 196 (1958).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 12

ant, which distributed the dye as a company wholly owned by the
president of the manufacturer. The plaintiff recovered $85,000 in a
trial court. The extensive opinion of a commissioner, adopted as that
of the Missouri Supreme Court, affirmed this judgment except as to
the amount, which was reduced to the still considerable sum of $65,000.
The plaintiff in this case, after about two and a half years use of the
defendant's dye, contracted allergic periarteritis nodosa. This is a rare
and serious disease of the arteries, involving systemic infection, and
usually fatal. Two physicians gave an opinion that this illness was a
sensitivity or allergic reaction to paraphenylenediamine contained in
the hair dye. On the basis of this testimony the verdict was sustained
on the causation point, although it was observed that the plaintiff's evidence was not "conspicuously impressive" and that there might be a
lack of "awareness of the grave responsibility involved in testifying
to matters about which there is in fact no accurate or reliable scientific
or medical knowledge and information."
The defendant seems to have relied mainly on the causation point,
but the facts also raise a negligence question. The plaintiff's case was
based on the assertion that there was a "negligent failure to give an
adequate warning of the danger to consumers of systemic injury because of acquired sensitivity to defendant's product." The defendant
had given the usual warning prescribed by the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetics Act for coal tar hair dye, reading, "Caution-This product contains ingredients which may cause skin irritation on certain
individuals and a preliminary test according to accompanying directions should first be made. This product must not be used for dyeing
the eyelashes or eyebrows; to do so may cause blindness." 3 The plaintiff made the prescribed test, with no reaction, before her first use of
the dye. It was not clear that the instructions directed other patch
tests than the initial one, but in any event it appeared that such
repeated tests, while they might have revealed a local or skin sensitivity, would not have indicated the plaintiff's type of "toxic,
systemic allergic reaction." Consequently the plaintiff claimed that
the warning given was insufficient with respect to the plaintiff's systemic reaction which resulted from the continued use of the dye.
The duty to warn with reference to the more usual allergic reactions
to hair dye seemed clear, even apart from the federal act, since it
appeared that three to four per cent of all users of the dye were
allergic to it. The situation is far less clear with reference to the
grave systemic injury suffered by this plaintiff. It appeared that between 1934 and 1955, over 50 million packages of the hair dye had
been distributed, and it was conceded by the plaintiff that "unless the
3. 52 STAT. 1040 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 361 (1952).
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present case is an instance, that there has never been either a reported
or an established case of periarteritis nodosa caused by paraphenylenediamine hair dye."
In spite of the fact that no previous injury of this sort had occurred,
the court sustained a finding by the jury that defendant "knew, or by
the exercise of due care should have known," of the risk of systemic
injury and should have given a more adequate warning. This finding
of a duty to warn obviously could not be based on any statistical
frequency of this type of injury, since this was the first case of the
kind. The duty was based rather on the concept of expert knowledge,
with emphasis on an obligation of the plaintiff "to keep reasonably
abreast of scientific knowledge and discoveries concerning this field."
In that connection, one of plaintiff's witnesses testified °that knowledge
of "the lurking dangers of paraphenylenediamine had been available
for thirty years." Another witness provided a list of twenty-three
articles in periodical medical -literature concerning paraphenylenediamine and its effects on animals and human beings. There was no testimony, however, that this chemical in the concentration used in
defendant's hair dye, 1/20 to 2/20 per cent, was known to be dangerous.
It appeared that 95 per cent of all hair dyes contain paraphenylenediamine, and that there are approximately 65 million applications of hair
dye a year, and still there had been no other case involving a serious
systemic allergy of the type to which the plaintiff claimed the warning
should have been extended.
The decision cannot be based on the theory of In re Polemis,4 that
a defendant who negligently threatens a minor injury to the plaintiff
is liable for harm of an unforeseeable extent which in fact results.
In the Braun case, while less serious allergic reactions were clearly
foreseeable, there was no negligence in that connection, for there was
an adequate warning with respect to the less serious allergies, and
the only negligence alleged was a failure to warn of the grave systemic allergy to which the plaintiff was susceptible. In substance the
Missouri court seems to be imposing a strict liability on the manufacturer. While there is some authority for extending the principle of
strict liability to non-food products,5 particularly in the case of
chemical products, 6 it would seem that if strict liability is to be
imposed this should be done expressly and not by finding foreseeability of injury where the result is quite unexpectable. It might be
added, however, that in the case of this particular product, hair dye,
4. [1921] 3 K.B. 560.
5. See Noel, Manufacturers of Products-The Drift Toward Strict Liability,
24 TBNN.L.REv. 963, 988 (1957).

6. See Green, Should the Manufacturerof General Products be Liable without Negligence? 24 TENN.L. REv. 928, 936 (1957).
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the courts have been noticeably more inclined to allow recovery by
an allergic plaintiff than in the case of other products. 7
The other recent case referred to, Wright v. Carter Products,Inc.,8
likewise places a new emphasis on expert knowledge. The product
there involved was a deodorant known as Arrid. The plaintiff, after
using this product for about five years without ill effects, contracted a
slight rash under her arms. Although the rash soon subsided, plaintiff discontinued use of the deodorant for about five months, then used
the same jar she had purchased earlier without any ill effects. When
she again used the product from this jar, however, a few weeks
later, she suffered a severe case of contact dermatitis.
Suit was brought for this injury in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, against the manufacturer, on
negligence grounds. It was conceded at the trial that Arrid contained
aluminum sulphate, an astringent which causes the pores to close and
reduces perspiration. Expert testimony was introduced by the plaintiff
to show that some individuals are allergic to aluminum sulphate.
There was further evidence that during the four years prior to the
plaintiff's injury, during which the defendant had sold over 82 million
jars of the product, it had received 373 complaints of skin irritation
allegedly caused by Arrid. It also appeared that the product had been
the object of a Federal Trade Commission order prior to plaintiff's
purchase in 1951, and that in connection with this order one medical
expert testified that during the course of ten years he had treated
fifty cases of dermatitis caused by Arrid.9
Since the evidence indicated that only a "miniscule" percentage of
potential customers would be harmed by using Arrid, the trial court
found that there was no duty to warn of any harmful propensities of
the product, dismissing the complaint and awarding judgment to the
defendant. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for
further findings. It concluded that under the law of Massachusetts,
where the injury took place, there may have been a negligent failure
to warn. It was found that a duty to warn might arise in any case
where injury was foreseeable, and that "duties to warn are not, in
7. See notes 60-73 infra.
8. 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957).

9. In the FTC proceeding the Commission found that Arrid "is not harmless,

and its use will cause skin irritation, and dermatitis in some people." Consequently the Commission ordered the manufacturer to cease and desist from
advertising "that said preparation is safe and harmless to use, without disclosing it may cause irritation of sensitive skin." This order was upheld in
Carter Products, Inc. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1951). The sale involved
in the Wright case apparently was made before this order became effective,
and the court in the Wright case stated that since the findings in the FTC case
were made in a controversy between different parties and at an administrative
hearing, they were admissible in evidence only on the issue of notice and not
as evidence of the fact of Arrid's propensities.
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all cases, measured by solely quantitative standards." The appellate
court thought that the statistical analysis of injury, "so heavily relied
upon by the trial court," was only one relevant factor on the issue of
foreseeability.
In its determination of the foreseeability issue, the lower court was
directed to consider whether "at least some potential users of Arrid
would suffer serious injuries." In addition to "the incidence of sensitivity," the court was directed to consider the gravity of any possible injury. There was also a direction to take account of the defendant's status as an expert in the use of chemicals for deodorant
purposes. This expert status was regarded as "tending to show that the
defendant knew, or should have known, of the possible harm that
might befall users of its product." The court took occasion to point
out in this connection that in Massachusetts the plaintiff might be
entitled to the benefit of a presumption that the defendant knew the
nature and quality of its product. 10 As a factor in favor of the defendant, the court was instructed to consider "the difficulty, if any, of
embodying an effective precaution in the labels or literature attached
to the product."
There was no thought by the court in this decision but that a warning would be sufficient to avoid liability. On this point it was stated,
"It would seem that a manufacturer cannot be required to alter a
formula that has proven safe for use by the overwhelming majority
of its users, but the standard of care owed by that manufacturer to
its ultimate consumers may include a duty to warn those few persons
who it knows cannot apply its product without serious injury." Even
in Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., where there was some evidence that
the offending element in the hair dye was "the most dangerous of
all cosmetics," there was no claim that the fromula would have to be
altered to avoid liability. The plaintiff's case was based entirely on
a negligent failure to give an adequate warning.
Although in the Wright case the plaintiff had suffered a slight rash
from the use of Arrid prior to her serious injury, it was found by the
appellate court that she was not barred by contributory negligence or
voluntary assumption of risk. It was pointed out in this connection
that she had a long and satisfactory experience with the product
before the occurrence of the first rash and an apparently harmless
application after it. Furthermore, it was considered that as a housewife unfamiliar with the chemical mysteries of cosmetics, she was
10. The court cited Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Barker, 228 F.2d 842 (1st
Cir. 1955) as authority for this presumption. The Sylvania case refers to such
a presumption, provided, however, that the plaintiff has first shown that the
product is "dangerous in its ordinary use." There is no reference to allergies
in the Sylvania case, which involved lung injury to a glass blower from glass
tubing coated with a compound containing beryllium.
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entitled to rely on well publicized assertions about the "harmless
nature of the product." In connection with these assertions the possibility of a liability based on negligent or false advertising was suggested in the opinion, but the reversal of the lower court was based
on its refusal to find any duty to warn.
It is evident from these two decisions that a manufacturer may no
longer be safe in relying on the fact that only a very small percentage
of the users of his product will be injured. The duty to warn nevertheless may arise from expert knowledge, actual or presumed. It is
not at all clear, however, that other courts will go as far in finding
foreseeability of harm as did the Missouri court in the Braun case, or
even as far as did the federal court in the Wright decision. To make a
balanced appraisal of the present law on the duty to warn allergic
consumers, it will be necessary to examine the earlier decisions, in
many of which the plaintiff has been less successful. Attention will
be given first to cases where the allergy is regarded as peculiar to the
plaintiff, then to cases where a definite class of persons is susceptible.
Most of the decisions, as will be seen, emphasize statistical frequency
of injury as a basis for determining liability, but in some of the
cases the matter of expert knowledge is regarded as a vital factor, as
in the Braun and Wright decisions.
I.

ALLERGY FOUND TO BE PECULIAR TO THE PLAINTIFF

There is a group of cases in which recovery ordinarily has been
denied on the ground that the plaintiff's allergy is peculiar, in the
sense that no other examples, or only one or two others, have been
brought to the attention of the court. A denial of recovery usually
results in this situation whether the action is based on negligence or
breach of warranty. Attention will be given first to the negligence
cases, then to the warranty actions.
Negligence-IsolatedInjury
Perhaps the earliest decision involving an isolated sort of injury is
Gould v. Slater Woolen Co." The plaintiff there purchased cloth
manufactured by the defendant and was injured simply from handling
it, apparently on account of some chrome compounds contained in
the dye. In a negligence suit it was held that there was no evidence to
go to the jury. It was pointed out that the dyes used were the most
common mordant used in wool dyeing and "had never caused injury
to anybody who merely handled the cloths." The opinion refers to
the general lack of knowledge at the time of the injury, finding that
defendant had "no reason to know" of the danger; but the court seems
11. 147 Mass. 315, 17 N.E. 531 (1888).
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to rely principally on the point that this was "the first instance of injury."
There are a number of other cases in which the isolated character
of the plaintiff's injuries seems quite clear, and the denial of recovery
is based on that ground. One of the principal decisions is Cleary v.
John M. Maris Co., 12 which involved some metallic nipple shields
made of lead. The shields were advertised as "in no way likely to be
injurious to the infant." They were worn steadily except during the
feeding of the child. The infant plaintiff contracted lead poisoning,
allegedly as a result of the use of the nipple shield. A negligence
suit was brought against the defendant manufacturer on the ground
that the shields were inherently dangerous and should not have been
marketed without a warning.
The jury found for the plaintiff, but the court entered judgment for
the defendant, dismissing the complaint on the merits. It appeared
that during a period of ninety years "many thousands" or "vast quantities" of these shields had been used, and it was not established that
there had been any other instance of lead poisoning. The court conceded a duty to warn wherever danger was foreseeable, but emphasized the lack of knowledge that the shields were "in any sense
dangerous." The opinion states in this connection, "Prior to the time
that this infant became ill there was no way of determining whether
the infant would, by some idiosyncratic reaction, respond to the infinitesimal quantities of lead which it claimed were ingested with each
feeding."
While there seemed to be some doubt in this case as to whether the
poisoning was in fact caused by a proper use of the shields or by some
other factor, the court evidently felt that even if there was causation
there would be no liability because of the lack of foreseeability. It was
observed that anticipation "results from knowledge possessed or
knowledge which a reasonably prudent manufacturer would possess."
In support of its conclusion against liability the court referred to an
earlier New York decision finding that there was no liability in the
case of a drug containing calomel, a cathartic, quoting from that
decision a statement that a preparation is not deleterious "simply because one person in a multitude of those using it happens to meet with
ill effects."'13 In the Cleary case the opinion refers to lack of actual
knowledge of any danger from the shields and emphasizes the lack of
14
foreseeabiity of injury where the plaintiff's case is an isolated one.
12. 173 Mlisc. 954, 19 N.Y.S.2d 38 (Sup. Ct. 1940).

13. Willson v. Faxon, Williams & Faxon, 138 App. Div. 359, 364, 122 N.Y.
Supp. 778, 781 (4th Dep't 1910), rev'd, 208 N.Y. 108, 101 N.E. 799 (1913), 47
L.R.A. (N.S.) 693 (1914).
14. A lower court opinion in New York, Singer v. Oken, 193 Misc. 1058, 87
N.Y.S.2d 686 (N.Y. City Ct. 1949), involving dermatitis from use of calomine
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Another decision which seems to involve an isolated sort of injury
is Walstrom Optical Co. v. Miller.15 There the plaintiff's skin was
injured from contact with dye on eyeglass frames which were manufactured and sold by the defendant. Suit was brought on negligence
grounds. The experts on both sides testified that plaintiff's injuries
were due to "a peculiar idiosyncrasy of her skin." This sensitivity could
be discovered only by a test covering a period of two or three days.
The dye was of a kind customarily used by manufacturing opticians,
had been used by the defendant "for many years and on many thousand eyeglass frames without injurious effect and had proven to be
harmless to persons of ordinary susceptibilities." Under these circumstances the court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff, finding that
she had established "neither negligence nor proximate causation."
There is language in the opinion suggesting that the court regarded
the plaintiff's sensitivity, rather than the dye, as the sole proximate
cause of the injury.16 The proximate causation approach has been
properly criticized, on the ground that the only real issue is negligence, since it is clear that the offending product as well as the plaintiff's sensitivity is an immediate cause of the injury, assuming it is
established that the harm results from contact with the product.17
The court also found, however, that there was no negligence since
the defendant could hardly be expected to foresee the plaintiff's sensitivity in view of the long and extensive use of the product without
injurious results. The matter of warning was not discussed, but since
this apparently was the first injury from the product, the court evilotion containing one per cent phenol, also seems to involve an isolated injury.
In finding for the defendant retailer the court stated that "in an action against
a druggist for negligence wherein he has sold a used and known combination
of drugs without reason to apprehend that it may prove dangerous or harmful
to one person among a multitude of users, but on the contrary from long experience in selling it he has reason for the belief that it might be used without
deleterious results, he is not guilty of negligence although it did in fact injure
one who bought and used it." The same lack of foreseeability of injury was
found in a federal case involving death from the administration of novocaine.
This was found to be an "accidental" death, within the meaning of an insurance policy, because the harm due to the "hypersusceptibility" of the plaintiff
was a result "which could not reasonably have been foreseen." There was no
evidence of any similar reactions. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 11 F.2d 486
(4th Cir. 1926). One of the New York cases, Kinkead v. Lysol, Inc., 250 App.
Div. 832 (N.Y. 1937) (memorandum decision), seems to exclude recovery by
allergic plaintiffs generally, but apparently the plaintiff's injury, from Lysol,
was a unique one. See Barasch, Allergies and the Law, 10 BROOKLYN L. REV.

363, 370, 373 (1941).
15. 59 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
16. An earlier opinion in the same jurisdiction clearly takes this position,
stating: 'We think the jury should have been told in appropriate language
that, if they believed the proximate cause of the injuries to appellee was his
abnormal hypersensitiveness, but for which the injury would not have occurred, a verdict should be returned for defendant." Hamilton v. Harris, 204
S.W. 450, 451 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
17. Comment, 49 MrcIH. L. REV. 253, 255 (1950); Note, Legal Aspects of Allergy, 5 VA-D.L. REV. 212, 223 (1952).
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dently considered that there would be no duty to warn all persons
interested in purchasing the frames to take tests requiring a period of
several days.
A number of negligence cases involving what was considered by
the court to be an isolated allergy are concerned with harm from
permanent wave products. In one of these, Briggs v. National Industries, Inc.,18 the plaintiff's hair was processed with some "Helene
Curtis" cold wave solution. Some of the solution was spilled by the
beauty parlor operator on the plaintiff's face and forearm. About three
days later she developed severe dermatitis, and suit was brought
against the manufacturer on negligence grounds. The negligence
alleged was that the defendant failed to warn users of the product
that the solution contained 6.28 per cent thioglycollate acid, and that
many persons were susceptible to harm from this ingredient.
Plaintiff's physician testified that she had suffered an allergic reaction, which he defined as "an abnormal reactivity of tissue." The
jury found for the plaintiff, but on appeal a judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict was upheld. It was emphasized in
the opinion that the plaintiff's injury was of an isolated character,
and that the record was "devoid of any evidence indicating that the
product in question had ever caused irritation prior to its use in the
instant case." The court referred to a rule that "a manufacturer must
give appropriate warning of any known dangers which the user
would not ordinarily discover" but emphasized the absence in this
case of any actual knowledge of the dangerous character of the product. The opinion does not consider the possibility of any duty to know
as experts. It has been criticized on this point,19 and as indicated
above, the recent Braun and Wright decisions place considerable reliance on the concept of a duty to know as experts as well as actual
knowledge, even though no appreciable percentage of allergic con20
sumers is involved.
It has been observed that since the decision in the Briggs case a
number of medical articles have been published showing that in fact
the plaintiff's susceptibility to thioglycollate was not unique.21 In
view, however, of the lack of any proof about the state of medical
knowledge at the time of the case, together with a lack of evidence
of any other injuries, the decision seems correct in finding that there
was no duty to warn, and it is regarded as correctly decided on its facts
in the standard treatises on torts.2
18. 92 Cal. App.2d 542, 207 P.2d 110 (1949).
19. See Comment, 49 MCH. L. REV. 253, 258 (1950).
20. See also 2 HARPER & JAmES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1551 (1956).
21. See Comment, 49 MxcH. L. REV. 253, 258 (1950).
22. See PROSSER, TORTS 503 (2d ed. 1955); 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS 1552 (1956).
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The Briggs case was followed in Bennett v. Pilot Products Co.,2
which likewise involved a permanent wave lotion containing ammonium thioglycollate. The plaintiff was a beautician who applied this
lotion with her hands, along with a powder fixative which contained
potassium bromate. After handling this mixture for seven or eight
times the plaintiff developed a dermatitis severe enough to cause her
to leave her profession. Suit was brought against the distributor of
the lotion on grounds of negligence in failing to warn that its product
contained irritants dangerous to users. The case is unusual in that
patch tests showed that the plaintiff did not react unfavorably to the
lotion alone but only to the combination of the defendant's lotion and
the powder fixative. While there was testimony that one woman in
a thousand was allergic to the ammonium thioglycollate in the wave
solution, the court nevertheless, regarded the plaintiff's injury as an
isolated one, stating there was no testimony "that would render reasonably foreseeable the peculiar sensitivity or idiosyncrasy" of this
plaintiff. Consequently it was concluded that the defendant ""could
not be held to have foreseen what in fact happened when the thioglycollate, itself harmless to appellant, in combination with the fixative, equally harmless, reacted on her because of an allergic skin."
The general tone of this opinion is quite unfavorable to recovery by
an allergic consumer, and it seems unlikely that recovery would have
been allowed even if the plaintiff had been injured by the defendant's
lotion alone. The court cites in support of its decision, rather than as
a point favorable to recovery, evidence that ammonium thioglycollate
produced a reaction in "but one allergic woman in 1000," and seems
to be using the word allergic as a term of condemnation. The opinion
concludes that there was no evidence to go to the jury on the question
of "the reasonable foreseeability of danger and harm to the normal
person contemplated by the law."
A concurring opinion in this case takes issue with the concept that
only the normal user is foreseeable, stating that if the defendant had
reason to believe that one out of every 1000 would be harmed as the
plaintiff was, "then it could foresee, and therefore must reasonably
anticipate that such would be the result." It was conceded that to
place a duty on the producer to warn the allergic of possible dangers
might in some circumstances "overburden business" but the actual
ground of the concurrence was that there was no evidence that defendant "had reason to believe that its product would be harmful
even to the allergic," prior to the plaintiff's injury. One wonders about
this statement, in view of the testimony that one out of 1000 reacted
unfavorably to ammonium thioglycollate. Since, however, the plain23. 120 Utah 474, 235 P.2d 525 (1951).
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tiff apparently did not introduce evidence of other injuries from the
defendant's product, the case seems best classed with those denying
recovery where plaintiff's injury apparently is an isolated one, and
the defendant does not acutally know that its product will cause
24
harm even to a few.
There is a recent case involving the same kind of product, Merrill
v. Beaute Vues Corp.,25 where the plaintiff was equally unsuccessful.
The defendant used the hair waving product there involved in accordance with directions. Shortly afterwards her eyes and face became
swollen, large hives appeared on her body, and her vision became
blurred. The eye injury proved to be permanent, and there was testimony that the product had damaged the plaintiff's optic nerve. Suit
was brought both on negligence and warranty grounds, but the plaintiff seems to have emphasized the negligence count. There were
allegations that her injuries were caused by ammonium thioglycollate
contained in the product and described as inherently dangerous. In
response to special interrogatories the jury found that ammonium
thioglycollate is "dangerous and injurious to the health of those who
use it" and that the defendant knew or should have known of the
danger. A verdict was returned for the plaintiff in the amount of
$45,000, but the trial judge sustained defendant's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, on the ground that there was insufficient
evidence to support the special findings of the jury. His own findings
were that the plaintiff was "not a member of a class expected to be
affected by the use of defendant's product" and that "her injury constituted an isolated instance of injury to an unusually susceptible
individual."
The court of appeals sustained this action. It did not find the plaintiff's injury to be a completely isolated one, for a medical article introduced at the trial brought out two other cases of injury to the optic
nerve resulting after use of a home permanent containing ammonium
thioglycollate. The opinion emphasizes, however, that the defendants
had sold over 13,500,000 packages of the product, and the industry
at large had sold over 500,000,000 packages of a similar product with
no injuries to the optic nerve reported except these two. Under these
circumstances the court found the issue to be as follows: "We therefore have the question as to whether a manufacturer who places a
product on the market, knowing that some unknown few, not in an
identifiable class which could be effectively warned, may suffer allergic reactions or other isolated injuries not common to the ordinary
or normal person, must respond in damages." In answering this
question in the negative, the opinion states that a reasonable person
24. See 51 MIcH. L. REv. 447 (1953).

25. 235 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1956).
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could not foresee the purchaser's condition and anticipate the harmful
consequences. On this same ground recovery on express or implied
warranty was denied with the statement: "Warranties do not extend
to injuries caused by peculiar idiosyncrasies or physical condition of
a user which are not reasonably foreseeable. The rule as to negligence
in such cases applies to warranties."
The general tone of the opinion is against recovery by an allergic
consumer, but there is nothing in the opinion which excludes the
concept of a duty to warn allergic consumers where "an identifiable
class which could be effectively warned" is involved.26 The court's
conclusion that no such class was established in this case is questioned in a concurring opinion by Judge Murrah, who states that a
clear duty to warn arises wherever "some" or even a "small proportion" of allergic users is involved. Judge Murrah's concurrence with
the prevailing opinion was only because the plaintiff denied any
allergy and rested her case on the grounds that ammonium thioglycollate was generally dangerous. The verdict was not supportable on this
theory, for the plaintiff's own physician did not testify that the substance was inherently dangerous or poisonous, or likely to injure any27
one who used it.
It is arguable that since serious injury to sight was the danger
threatened, a duty to warn arose in this case even though only two
cases of such injury prior to the plaintiff's injury were known to
science. The reluctance of the majority to impose such a duty is
understandable, however, in view of the fact that over 500,000,000
packages of this kind of product had been marketed without any
evidence of injury to the optic nerve except for the two cases reported
in a medical article introduced at the trial. This article had not come
to the attention of the defendant before the trial, and while there
might well be a duty to know of it, there was other scientific information, based on findings of the Federal Food and Drug Administration
and the Committee on Cosmetics of the American Medical Assooiation,
to the effect that a judicious use of ammonium thioglycollate was a
"relatively harmless" procedure. Under these circumstances it is not
26. See 22 Mo. L. REV. 223 (1957).

27. The case differs in this respect from Hardy v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co.,
209 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1954), where the plaintiff lost her sight completely after
using a detergent, Dreft, to wash surgical instruments. Perspiration mingled
with the detergent had run into her eyes. The product had been advertised
as safe for the eyes. Suit was brought on grounds of negligence and breach of
implied warranty. The negligence alleged was a failure to warn of an inherently dangerous chemical, sodium lauryl sulfate, in the product, and there
was some medical testimony that the injury was due to this chemical. The
court held that it was error to direct a verdict for the defendant. There is no
discussion of the allergy problem, but since there was no indication of other
injuries of this kind from Dreft, the case may involve an isolated allergic
reaction.
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surprising that the statistical rarity of serious injury was regarded as
negativing any duty to warn. The court also apparently thought that
a warning that the product might injure the eyes of about three
persons out of 500,000,000 would not have much practical effect. While
this cause does not involve a completely isolated injury, the number
of other injuries was so small that it seems more like the cases involving an allergy peculiar to the plaintiff than those which will be
considered later involving a definite class of susceptible users of
the product.28
It thus appears that where the suit is based on negligence, the courts
seem to regard the isolated character of the injury as conclusively
establishing that the harm is unforeseeable. Efforts to establish foreseeability of injury on the basis of expert knowledge have been
unsuccessful, in the case where isolated allergic injury is involved,
except in the recent Missouri case discussed above, Braun v. Roux
Distrib.Co. The Braun case seems to represent a sharp departure from
earlier decisions in this respect. It also seems to be imposing, as indicated above, what is in substance a strict liability. Since about
65,000,000 applications of similar hair dye had been made annually
without other injuries of the type involved in this case, it seems quite
28. There is another cosmetics negligence case, involving suntan oil, Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. Brown, 107 F.2d 938 (3d Cir. 1939), in which the plaintiff
failed to recover for what apparently was an allergic injury. The case is not
significant, however, because of the defective proof of causation. The plaintiff's
doctor testified that her injury was due to an aniline dye known as "Bismark"
brown, an element which it was later stipulated was not contained in the
defendant's product. Likewise in the recent case of Kent v. McKesson &
Robbins, Inc., 19 N.Y.L.J. No. 13, p. 7, F.D.C.L.R. J 22,526 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1958), a suit against the manufacturer on negligence grounds and against the

retailer for breach of warranty failed because of the lack of sufficient evidence
that the defendant's Abolene cream was in fact the cause of the plaintiff's
atropic dermatitis. The case of Luckett v. Adolphus Cleaners, 262 S.W.2d 191
(Ky. 1953) involved what may have been an allergic dermatitis from oxalic

acid found in a hat band, but recovery was denied because of lack of evidence

that the defendant cleaners were responsible for the presence of the harmful
substance. The leading case of Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d
693, 164 A.L.R. 559 (1946), which may in fact have involved an allergic in-

jury from perfume, does not seem significant from this standpoint since the
jury found in fact that the injury "was caused by some harmful ingredient
in the perfume rather than by her own peculiar and unforeseeable susceptibility." The Yardley case was followed in Cumberland v. Household Research

Corp. of America, 145 F. Supp. 782 (D. Mass. 1956) although the maker testified that he had sold 70,000 bottles of the household disinfectant there involved,
and had never received a complaint before, because "it can be found to be

negligence not to anticipate harm which a product will cause to a normal
person." See text accompanying note 48 infra. Likewise in Grant v. Australian

Knitting Mills, Ltd. [1936] A.C. 85 (Austl.), it was found that the plaintiff
was a "normal" user. There is a case involving dermatitis from bath salts,

where the plaintiff was nonsuited because the evidence that she was hyper-

sensitive, and that the salts were innocuous to normal persons, with a statement that in the absence of "special circumstances" there was no duty to.
abnormal users. Levi v. Colgate-Palmolive Proprietary, Ltd. [1941] 41 S.R. 48
(N.S.W.), 58 W.N. 63. This case apparently involved an isolated sort of
injury.
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unrealistic to hold that there was in fact any foreseeability of this
injury.
Warranty-IsolatedInjury
Plaintiffs have been about equally unsuccessful in actions for
breach of warranty in the situation where the plaintiff's injury is
found to be of an isolated character. The suits have been on grounds
of breach of the implied warranties of merchantability or of fitness
incorporated into the Uniform Sales Act, and occasionally they have
been based on breach of an expressed warranty.2 9 In only a few of
these cases has the plaintiff succeeded.
A good many of the warranty cases have involved harmful dye in
articles of apparel. The earliest of these are two Massachusetts decisions, Flynn v. Bedell Co., 30 and Bradt v. Holloway.31 Both cases
involved dermatitis alleged to have been caused by some "poisonous"
substance in dyed fur coats, and both were decided on the same day.
In the Flynn case recovery was allowed on an implied warranty of
fitness, but only because the court found that the dye "was injurious
in the course of normal use." The decision goes on to say that "where
there is no evidence of any intrinsically unhealthful feature in a fur,
but only that the buyer is constitutionally unable to wear fur of this
sort because of a supersensitive skin, the warranty of fitness presumably does not apply." The warranty was not regarded as extending
to "matters wholly unknown to the dealer and peculiar to the individual buyer."
In the companion case of Bradt v. Holloway, the plaintiff failed to
recover on the warranty because there was no evidence that the dyed
fur involved in that case would cause injury "to any normal person."
As in the Flynn case the opinion seems to consider injury to "hypersensitive" persons as outside the scope of implied warranty. It has
been said that the court in the Flynn case was thinking in terms of an
32
isolated susceptibility, rather than in terms of a class of persons.
Against this interpretation of the case is the fact that the verdict was
sustained only on the ground that "the plaintiff's skin was not delicate"
and because "it appears that the particular 'defect' which injured the
29. The implied warranties are in § 15 of the act. Section 15(1) reads:
"Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the
particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that the
buyer relies on the seller's skill and judgment (whether he be the grower or
manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be
xeasonably fit for such purpose." Section 15(2) states: "Where the goods are
bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of that description
(whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be of merchantable quality."
30. 242 Mass. 450, 136 N.E. 252 (1922).
31. 242 Mass. 446, 136 N.E. 254 (1922).

32. Horowitz, Allergy of the Plaintiff as a Defense in Actions Based upon
Breach of Implied Warranty of Quality, 24 So. CAL. L. REv. 221, 230-31 (1951).
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plaintiff would have similarly injured any normal person." It may
well be, however, that since no attempt was made in either of these
two cases to show that the plaintiff was a member of an allergic class,
the decisions do not actually mean anything more than that the
implied warranty will not extend to a plaintiff who fails to submit
evidence that his allergy is more than an isolated one. In neither the
Flynn nor the Bradt decision does the court indicate any realization
of the point brought out in an earlier negligence decision, Gerkin
v. Brown & Sehler Co., 33 which will be discussed in connection with
the negligence cases involving a definite class of allergic users, that
a considerable percentage of persons are sensitive to dyed fur.
In a number of later cases involving injury from apparel, in which
the plaintiff failed to point out others who Were allergic to the same
product, it likewise has been held that there is no breach of warranty.
In the first of these, Ross v. Porteous,Mitchell & Bruin Co.,34 involving
dress shields used to protect from arm pit perspiration, the plaintiff
sued the retailer, claiming a breach of the implied warranty of fitness
when she contracted dermatitis. It appeared that the shields had been
on the market for four years and that annual sales ran into the mllions. The defendant's chemist testified that no injury had ever been
known to result from the shields, although they had been sold throughout the country. The plaintiff did not produce any evidence that'
others had been harmed, nor did his witness point to any particular
harmful substance in the product. Under these circumstances the
court found no breach of the implied warranty. The language of the
court seems to go far enough to exclude recovery on warranty grounds
by allergic consumers generally, for it is stated that "if the article
could be worn by any normal person without harm and injury is
suffered by the purchaser only because of a supersensitive skin, there
is no breach of the implied warranty of reasonable fitness of the article
'35
for personal wear.
The Ross decision was cited with approval two years later in a case
involving injury from dye in a cotton dress, Barrett v. S. S. Kresge
Co. 36 After wearing the dress the plaintiff suffered extensive dermatitis and sued the retailer on grounds of breach of implied warranty
of fitness for the purpose for which the article was intended. It was
33. 177 MVich. 45, 143 N.W. 48 (1913).
34. 136 Me. 118, 3 A.2d 650 (1939).
35. In the same year the English Court of Appeal held, in a case involving
dermatitis from a tweed coat, that the implied warranty of fitness under the
Sales of Goods Act did not extend to a person who could not satisfy the court
that she was a "normal person." It appeared that "hundreds of thousands" of
similar coats had been supplied and that no other complaint had been made.
There was medical evidence that the plaintiff was "abnormal" and suffered
an "idiosyncratic effect." Griffiths v. Peter Conway, Ltd. [1939] 1 All E.R.
685 (C.A.).
36. 144 Pa. Super. 516, 19 A.2d 502 (1941).
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shown that the defendant had sold 4,000 of these dresses and "had no
knowledge of anyone else experiencing any skin reaction to the wearing of them." Furthermore, there was no testimony that "the material
in the dress would cause irritation to anyone other than Mrs. Barrett."
Under these circumstances the court held that there was no implied
warranty that the dress, "although harmless to practically all the
public, does not contain any substance or ingredient that may injuriously affect some individual purchaser who has a peculiar susceptibility unknown to the vendor." It was considered that to hold otherwise
would expose merchants to a "far reaching and possibly ruinous liability, which they cannot anticipate and with reasonable precaution
avoid." The plaintiff did not point out any specifically harmful chemical in the dress, and there was no evidence of any actual knowledge of
a harmful ingredient. While it may be that plaintiff's allergy to the
dye was not as unique as the court supposed the case is typical in
holding that where the evidence before the court indicates that plaintiff's allergy is an isolated one, recovery will be denied on warranty
as well as on negligence grounds. The general tone of the opinion is
not favorable to recovery by anyone other than the "normal person,"
but the court does not expressly exclude the possibility of recovery
on warranty grounds where a definite class of allergic persons is
involved, for then it might not be dealing with "a peculiar susceptibility unknown to the vendor" which he could not with reasonable
precaution guard against.
37
The Barrett case was followed in Stanton v. Sears Roebuck & Co.
where the plaintiff suffered severe dermatitis after wearing a dyed
rayon dress purchased from the defendant. Here again no chemical
analysis of the dress was made, but two doctors testified that the dye
in it was the cause of the plaintiff's illness. The same doctors testified
that "countless other women could have worn the dress without any
reaction or ill effect whatever." During the year that preceded this
purchase, the defendant had sold half a million dresses of the same
type, and the plaintiff apparently "was the only one who had complained of any ill effects." Under these circumstances the court held,
quoting extensively from the Barrett decision, that the implied warranty of fitness did not extend to a purchaser with a peculiar susceptibility.
The Massachusetts court had to again consider the problem of harm
from dyed dresses in Kurriss v. Conrad & Co.38 and Payne v. R.H.
White Co.3 9 In both of these cases the plaintiff fared better than in the
ones just considered. In the Kurriss decision the plaintiff did not point
37. 312 Ill. App. 496, 38 N.E.2d 801 (1942).
38. 312 Mass. 670, 46 N.E.2d 12 (1942).
39. 314 Mass. 63, 49 N.E.2d 425 (1943).
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to any specific harmful ingredient but was able to show that the
dermatitis was present at the particular places where the pink dress
came into contact with her body. Under these circumstances the court
considered that on the causation point the case was like Flynn v.
Bedell Co. rather than Bradt v. Holloway. Although there was evidence that the dermatitis from which the plaintiff suffered was to be
classed as an allergic disturbance, the court did not seem to regard
this as grounds for considering the plaintiff as other than a normal
user. The opinion does not refer to the language in the Flynn and the
Bradt cases excluding the hypersensitive from the operation of the
warranty. Instead the court seems to avoid the problem by invoking
a rudimentary concept of allergy. The evidence that plaintiff's injury
was to be classed as allergic is brushed aside with the statement:
It is consistent with the testimony as to this classification that what is
meant is that the dermatitis is something that is not "due to anything
taken in or inhaled but ... to something that the skin comes in contact
with." We are of opinion that there is nothing in this specific piece of
evidence which requires a finding for the defendant, if in other aspects
of the possible findings the plaintiff is entitled to recover. 40
As authority for this statement, the court cites Bianchi v. Denholm &
McKay Co.41 That is a case where the plaintiff was regarded as a
member of a group, and it will be discussed in connection with the
warranty cases where a definite class of allergic users is involved. It
is possible that in the Kurriss case the plaintiff is being regarded as
a member of a sensitive class, but there was no evidence of other
allergic injuries from the product, and it seems more likely that the
court was regarding the plaintiff as normal, since obviously normal
people as well as the hypersensitive may be harmed by contact as
well as inhalation.
The other Massachusetts case, Payne v. R. H. White Co., decided a
year later, quite clearly is based on the ground that the plaintiff was
to be regarded as normal. The plaintiff there suffered from dermatitis
after wearing a brown dress purchased from the defendant. The
court stated that in order for the plaintiff to recover under the implied
warranty of fitness she "must show that the dress was unfit to be
worn by a normal person and cannot recover by a mere showing that
it was unfit for her or for some unusually susceptible person to wear."
The court further found, however, that it would be assumed "that
the plaintiff is a normal person without any evidence specifically directed to that fact" and that therefore the implied warranty of fitness
would be applicable, if properly alleged.
40. 46 N.E.2d at 15.
41. 302 Mass. 469, 19 N.E.2d 697 (1939).
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A few years later, another plaintiff in Massachusetts failed to
recover for dermatitis from gloves because it appeared she was not
normal. In that case, Longo v. Touraine Stores, Inc.,4 2 the plaintiff's
doctor did not point to any substance in the gloves harmful to the
group of sensitive users but did testify that the plaintiff "was allergic
to this particular pair of gloves" as shown by patch tests. Under these
circumstances the court said, quoting from the Payne case, "the plaintiff had the burden of proving that the gloves were unfit 'to be worn
by a normal person, and cannot recover by merely showing that (they
were) unfit for her or for some unusually susceptible person to wear.'"
It thus appears that while in some of the Massachusetts cases involving
injury from clothing the plaintiff has recovered, there is little in these
decisions to encourage an action based on an allergic injury of an
isolated character.
There is a Missouri case, Marra v. Jones Store Co.,43 involving dermatitis contracted after use of a dyed satin blouse purchased from
the defendant retailer. Suit was brought for breach of implied warranty of fitness. Plaintiff's doctor testified that the blouse contained
a "toxic foreign substance" which had caused the harm. The doctor
had not analysed the garment and could not name any specific poisonous substance. He had not made any patch test but testified that plaintiff's skin was normal and that her dermatitis "was not an allergic
condition." A chemist testifying for defendant had analysed the
garment and gave evidence that it did not contain any poisonous substance. He further stated that some individuals might be sensitive to
the dye, but that there was no way of predicting this in advance, and
that the sensitive individuals "would not be numerous enough to
constitute a class." The jury found for the plaintiff and the verdict
was sustained on appeal. The court referred to testimony that probably not all the chemical contents of the dyes used in the garment
had been discovered by the tests made, stating, "Consequently we
cannot say that there may not have been some unknown chemical in
the blouse which, under certain conditions, could or would cause any
normal person to contract dermatitis." In view of the conflicting medical testimony as to whether the plaintiff's condition was an allergic one
or not, it is clear that this decision does not hold that the implied
warranty of fitness covered anyone other than a normal person, or
that the plaintiff can recover without testimony that the product is
poisonous to a normal person.
There are several warranty cases involving cosmetics in which isolated allergic consumers are excluded from the scope of the warranty,
42. 319 Mass. 727, 66 N.E.2d 792 (1946).
43. 170 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. App. 1943).
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besides the case of Merrill v. Beaute Vues Corp.,44 which, as indicated
earlier, denied recovery in warranty as well as on negligence grounds.
In one of the earlier cosmetics cases, Zager v. F. W. Woolworth Co.,45
the plaintiff used some freckle cream containing mercury purchased
from defendant retailer. Four or five hours later plaintiff suffered
from dermatitis, and a patch test showed that she was allergic to the
cream. Suit was brought on grounds of breach of express warranty
and breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness.
In defense it was alleged that any injury suffered by plaintiff was the
"sole result of plaintiff's physical and bodily condition and constitutional composition." A judgment for defendant was sustained on
appeal, with a statement that the evidence supported the finding that
the plaintiff's "constitutional composition was the proximate cause of
the dermatitis which she suffered." The court seemed to take it for
granted that if the plaintiff's reaction was an allergic one, due to
hypersensitivity, it was not covered by the express or implied warranties. There was no evidence of injury to other persons, or of knowledge on the part of the defendant that the mercury or any other
ingredient in the cream was harmful to a class of users, and so far as
appears from the record the plaintiff's susceptibility was unique. It
may be that all the case actually holds is that an isolated allergic consumer is not covered by the warranties.
The plaintiff was more successful in Graham v. JordanMarsh Co.,46
which involved dermatitis from the use of cold cream purchased at
defendant's store. The lower court directed a verdict for defendant,
in a suit for breach of express warranty and breach of the implied
warranty of fitness. This action was taken apparently on the basis of
testimony by the plaintiff's own physician that her injury was an
allergic one, due to sensitivity. In sustaining exceptions to the
directed verdict the court stated that the jury could disregard the
testimony of the plaintiff's physician and "adopt as true the testimony
of the plaintiff that there was nothing wrong with her skin when she
purchased the jar of cold cream ... and draw the inference that she
was normal." 47 The Massachusetts court clearly makes easier than
does the California court in the Zager case the plaintiff's road to
recovery. The facts in the two cases seem about the same, for in the
Zager case also the record contained evidence which might have supported contrary findings on the issue of whether plaintiff's "constitu44. See note 25 supra.

45. 30 Cal. App. 2d 324, 86 P.2d 389 (App. Dep't 1939).

46. 319 Mass. 690, 67 N.E.2d 404 (1946).
47. In a negligence case a plaintiff succeeded in Massachusetts in what may
in fact have been an isolated allergy injury on the basis of a jury finding that
the injury was not due to her susceptibility. See Carter v. Yardley & Co.,
note 28 supra.
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tional composition" was the cause of the injury. In the Zager case,
however, the court was faced with a finding of fact at the trial in favor
of the defendant. It is clear that both courts considered that if the
injury was in fact an allergic one it was not covered by the express
or implied warranties, in the absence of evidence that there was a
definite class of susceptible consumers of the product. The substantial
aid which the plaintiff may receive, however, from the presumption of
normality is illustrated by Cumberlandv. Household Research Corp. of
America,4 8 a case involving injury to the plaintiffs from a disinfectant
containing chlorophenyl phenol. There was testimony by the maker
that he had sold 70,000 bottles of the product and had never received a
complaint before, and that there were 100 gallons in the particular
batch involved. The plaintiff produced no evidence that chlorophenyl
phenol in the concentration used "was harmful to anyone except the
plaintiff." The court nevertheless refused to direct a verdict for the
defendant in an action for breach of express and implied warranties.
While the court granted a new trial on the issue of liability, as well as
because of excessive damages, it refused to direct the verdict for the
defendant even though it referred to the presumption of normality
in this case as a "very weak one." This decision indicates that it may
49
be quite difficult to conclusively rebut the presumption of normality.
The most recent Massachusetts case based on warranty is Jacquot V.

Win. Filene's Sons Co.50 This decision, like most of the earlier ones,
denies recovery to an allergic plaintiff. The injury was from dermatitis
after use of a fingernail kit consisting of five liquids and a powder purchased from the defendant retailer. There was no presumption of
48. 145 F. Supp. 782 (D.Mass. 1956).
49. The court also refused to direct a verdict for the defendant as a maker
on negligence grounds. See note 28 supra. Another implied warranty of fitness
case involving injury to plaintiff's hands, allegedly from bleaching solution,
Landers v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 172 Ore. 116, 139 P.2d 788 (1943), follows the
other warranty cases involving an isolated sort of injury and denies recovery.
The jury found for defendant, and the trial judge ordered a new trial. This
order was reversed principally on the ground that there was no evidence that
the solution contained any specific deleterious ingredient which "made it
reasonably likely that it would cause injury when used as directed." Under
these circumstances the court found that evidence showing merely that injury
following use was insufficient to establish causation. With reference to the
allergy point the court stated: "It is not necessary for us to go as far as some
of the cited cases which hold that there is no breach of implied warranty
where the injury is caused by the peculiar susceptibility of the plaintiff, persuasive as those cases may be." 139 P.2d at 797. Likewise in a more recent

North Carolina case involving dermatitis from a hair rinse the court was
unsatisfied with the proof of causation, but in any event took the position that
"in an action by the buyer of a product against the seller for breach of warranty to recover damages for injuries resulting from the use of the product,

there is no liability upon the seller, where the buyer was allergic or unusually
susceptible to injury from the product, which fact was wholly unknown to the

seller and peculiar to the buyer." Hanrahan v. Walgreen Co., 243 N.C. 268, 90

S.E.2d 392, 393 (1955).

50. 149 N.E.2d 635 (Mass. 1958).
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normality because of the plaintiff's own testimony that following the
use of such things as perfumes, nail polish, and mascara she had
temporary blotches on her skin. The injury was considered to be an
isolated one because of testimony by a dermatologist that during ten.
to eleven years of practice this was the first case he had encountered
of dermatitis from the use of this product, together with evidence that
in 1955 over 500 kits of this product had been sold without any other
claim of injury. There was no analysis of the contents of the kit nor
was there a showing of any "generally injurious" ingredients. Under
these circumstances the court found that the product was fit for use
by normal persons and further that plaintiff was not a member of an
allergic class. On this latter point the court said, "The plaintiff has
not shown that she is one of a class of persons sensitive to the fingernail kit to whom the implied warranty of fitness might extend...."
It was found that an express warranty would not extend any further
than an implied one. 5' It might be added that even if a duty to warn
had been found, the duty may have been adequately fulfilled by
means of instructions inclosed with the kit warning against use by
persons with allergies. This point was explicitly considered in another
Massachusetts case, Taylor v. Jacobson,52 involving hair dye. That
case makes it clear that where plaintiff reads and disregards "reasonable, intelligible, and adequate warnings" to take a preliminary or
patch test, a resulting illness of the type warned against is not within
the scope of any implied warranty given by the retailer.
There is a quite recent decision by a trial court judge, Zampino v.
Colgate-PalmoliveCo.,5 3 which seems to go much further in allowing
recovery for an isolated allergic injury than do the cases which have
been discussed. This decision apparently extends the scope of the
implied warranties of fitness and merchantability to a plaintiff who,
may be allergic, even where there is a failure to point out any others
who have suffered similar harm. The plaintiff had used a deodorant
called Veto, and suffered after its use from burning, pimples and
swelling under both arms. She sued both the manufacturer and the
retailer on grounds of breach of the implied warranties of fitness for
purpose and merchantability. The suit was dismissed as to the manufacturer, but the plaintiff recovered $4,500 from the retailer.
The defendant urged in this case that a mere showing that the prod51. This finding may be contrasted with a dictum in a Delaware case where
the court stated that an implied warranty might well not extend to allergic
risks unknown to the seller, but that "where the warranty was expressly
made, it makes no difference whether the warrantor knew [that] it was false."
See McLachlan v. Wilmington Dry Goods Co., 41 Del. 378, 22 A.2d 851 (Super.
Ct. 1941), 26 MiNN. L. R.v. 668 (1942).
52. 147 N.E.2d 770 (Mass. 1958).
53. 173 N.Y.S.2d 117 (Sup. Ct., Spec. T. 1958); 13 FooD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 559

(1958).
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uct did not prove fit for application to this plaintiff's skin did not establish that Veto was not of merchantable quality. The trial judge found
this contention without merit, stating, "Defendant's argument along
this vein may have had some force if the plaintiff, Mrs. Zampino, was
suing in negligence, and, if there was a showing that she was suffering
from an allergy or some unusual susceptibility which could have been
attributed to the ingredient, aluminum sulfamate, which went into the
making of Veto, and, that the cause of the injury was the allergy and
not the product." So far as the warranty action was concerned, however, the court stated that the fact that the product did not prove fit
for application to this plaintiff constituted "the very reason why it is
unmerchantable."
Except for this trial court decision in the Zampino case, it seems
clear that even courts favorably inclined toward an allergic plaintiff
require that he establish himself as one of an identifiable class, and
will not regard an isolated sort of allergic injury as within the scope
of the implied warranty. It may be that in a case like Cumberland v.
Household Research Corp. of America where the "presumption of
normality" is applied notwithstanding the isolated character of the
plaintiff's injury, the court is in effect finding liability for an allergic
injury, but the language of such an opinion, with the emphasis on the
plaintiff's normality, certainly does not purport to bring an isolated
4
allergic plaintiff within the warranty.m

II.

ALLERGIES INVOLVING A DEFINITE CLASS

When we turn to cases where it is established that a definite class of
persons is allergic to a product, recovery has been much more frequent.
Attention will be given first to the negligence cases, then to those
where the plaintiff's claim is based on breach of warranty.
Negligence-SusceptibleClass
It would seem that the recent negligence case of Wright v. Carter
Products, Inc. 55 should be considered as involving a class of allergic
users. It appeared that the defendant had received 373 complaints of
skin irritation resulting from Arrid, the deodorant there involved, and

one doctor had treated fifty cases of dermatitis caused by the product
in the course of a ten-year period. Since the defendant had sold

82,000,000 jars of Arrid over the four-year period during which the
complaints were received the class was very small from a percentage
54. The case of Hardy v. Proctor & Gamble Mg. Co., note 27 supra, may involve liability for an isolated allergic injury on grounds of breach of implied
warranty, but there is no discussion of the allergy problem and it seems to
have been assumed that plaintiff could prove that the detergent there involved
was harmful to normal users.
55. Discussed note 8 supra.
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angle, but it nevertheless included a substantial number of persons,
with the result that the court did not regard the plaintiff's injury as
one of an isolated character. As indicated, however, in the earlier
discussion of the case, the court emphasized expert knowledge, as
well as statistical frequency, as the basis for the duty to warn. It was
found to be enough that "at least some" of the potential users of the
product would suffer injuries, and that the defendant's duty to know
as an expert should be taken into account along with "the incidence of
sensitivity."
Turning to the earlier decisions, the first negligence case which deals
with the situation where the plaintiff establishes himself as a member
of a class is Gerkin v. Brown & Sehier Co.0 This decision was back
in 1913, but it is characterized by a forward looking approach and
has exerted great influence on the law relating to allergies. The case
involved a dyed fur collar which when turned up caused dermatitis.
The jobber who supplied the coat to the retailer was sued on negligence grounds. The defendant's president admitted that about one out
of every hundred customers could not wear any kind of dye in fur,
that he had received about twenty complaints during the preceding
ten years, and that it was common knowledge in the fur trade that
some people simply could not wear dyed furs. The complaint alleged
that the defendant was negligent under these circumstances in failing
to warn customers that the dyed fur was injurious to some persons.
In sending the case back for a new trial on other issues, the court
stated with reference to the duty to warn:
When the fact is once established and demonstrated by experience that
a certain commodity apparently harmless contains concealed dangers, and
when distributed to the public through the channels of trade and used for
the purposes for which it was made and sold is sure to cause suffering to,
and injure the health of, some innocent purchaser, even though the percentage of those injured be not large, a duty arises to and a responsibility
rests upon the manufacturer and dealer with knowledge to the extent,
at least, of warning the ignorant consumer or user of the existence of
hidden danger ....
That the great majority of persons are safe from the particular danger
concealed in the article sold, or that few injuries in fact result from its
use, does not militate against this principle when the certain fact. of
imminent danger to a percentage is established.57
The court distinguished the Massachusetts decision in Gould v. Slater
Woolen Co. 58 on the grounds that there were no previous cases of
harm from the cloth there involved, and the defendant had no reason
to know of the danger. In the Gerkin case there was knowledge of
56. 177 Mich. 45, 143 N.W. 48 (1913).
57. 143 N.W. at 53.
58. Discussed in text accompanying note 11 supra.
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the danger, together with a considerable statistical frequency of injury.
The principle that there is a duty to warn allergic consumers has
received a considerable development in a series of cases involving hair
dye, which may tend to explain somewhat the decision for the plaintiff
in Braun v. Roux DistributingCo., Inc.59 The earliest of these, Wilson
v. Goldman,60 involved a hair dye containing three per cent nitrate of
silver. The dye was advertised as "harmless." Fifteen minutes after
using it the plaintiff suffered from severe itching of the scalp, followed by inflamation and eruptions. In a negligence suit against the
manufacturer two physicians testified that the silver nitrate solution
in the dye could produce this result, and there was evidence that this
ingredient, when applied to the skin, "produces a burning pain with
partial destruction of the tissues." The defendant's experts testified
that silver nitrate in the quantity used in the dye was harmless. The
opinion does not include much discussion of the allergy problem, but
the court observed, in sustaining a verdict for the plaintiff, that "it is
well known that some persons are more sensitive to skin irritation than
others." Evidently the court considered that the plaintiff's sensitivity,
if present, was one possessed by a substantial class and should not
operate as a defense if the jury believed that the harm resulted from
the use of the dye and that this injury was foreseeable.
The next case, Cahill v. Inecto, Inc., 61 involved a hair dye called

"Inecto Rapid," a product which is involved in several later decisions,
sometimes under other names. About seven hours after application
of the dye the plaintiff began to suffer from severe itching and soon
her face became so swollen that she could not open her eyes. Ulcers
formed and her hair fell out. In a negligence suit it was alleged that
while the dye was stated to be "positively safe for use on all healthy
skins," it in fact was inherently dangerous. The defense of allergy
was raised, for the court refers to testimony of two physicians called
by the defendant "to prove that the plaintiff had some pre-disposition
or some idiosyncrasy making her susceptible to hair dye." The court
adds, however, that the witnesses "absolutely failed to make such
proof" and finds that the plaintiff was "in perfect health." Under these
circumstances the court thought that it was incumbent on the defendant rather than the plaintiff, once it had been shown that the
product had caused the harm, to supply an analysis and produce proof
that the dye contained no harmful ingredient. If the defendant had
been able to prove that the plaintiff had possessed an isolated sensitivity to the dye the decision apparently would have been in its favor;
59. Discussed in text accompanying note 2 supra.
60. 133 Minn. 281, 158 N.W. 332 (1916).
61. 208 App. Div. 191, 203 N.Y. Supp. 1 (1st Dep't 1924).
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but since there was a failure of any such proof, the court emphasized
the testimony of a physician that the dye was "the competent producing cause.., and the sole possible one" of the plaintiff's injuries.
A few years later in Karr v. Inecto, Inc.,62 involving the same product, recovery was denied. The plaintiff in this case was a hairdresser.
Her finger became stained with the dye and twelve hours later developed a morbid condition which the attending physician thought was
caused by the dye. No analysis of the dye was produced by either
party. The court sustained a dismissal of the complaint because of
lack of evidence on the causation point. The court emphasized that
the dye had not injured the customer the plaintiff was treating,
stating:
Possibly some individuals may possess a peculiar immunity against the
effects of a particular chemical poison or irritant; possibly other individuals possess a peculiar susceptibility. We know only that, even if the
dye used may possibly be a competent producing cause of a morbid condition such as developed on plaintiff's finger, itdoes not always produce
such a result, otherwise the customer would not have escaped injury. All
else rests purely on conjecture. 63
This case does not seem very different on its facts from the Cahill
decision where the plaintiff also failed to point out any specific harmful ingredient. The court distinguished the Cahill case simply by
stating that there "apparently" all "other possible causes were excluded." In neither case was there any convincing evidence, apparently, that the plaintiff was unusually sensitive to the product. In the
Karr decision the court stresses the twelve hour lapse of time between
the use of the dye and the injury, but in the Cahill case also there was
a considerable time interval, a lapse of seven hours. It seems evident
that in the Karr case the court is insisting on stricter standards of
proof as to cause in fact, and also that it was unwilling to regard an
allergic reaction as a proximate result, since the dye did not "always"
cause harm.
This disposition to rule against an allergic plaintiff was reaffirmed
by the New York court five years later in Drake v. Herrman,4 where
the court refused to order disclosure of the secret Inecto formula on
an examination before trial. The court there said that the plaintiff
must prove the presence of "inherently dangerous and poisonous
ingredients" and concluded that these could be discovered by analysis
of the product. With reference to the allergy point the court stated
that "if the secret compound contains nothing except harmless ingredients and its alleged injurious effect upon plaintiff was due to her
62. 247 N.Y. 60, 160 N.E. 398 (1928).

63. 160 N.E. at 399.

64. 261 N.Y.414, 185 N.E. 685 (1933).
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idiosyncrasy, then defendant's property right is entitled to preservation." The general approach in both the Karr and Drake cases is that
only the "normal person" will be protected and that the plaintiff must
prove that the product contains an ingredient which is "poisonous" to
such a person.
In the next hair dye case, Arnold v. May Dep't Stores Co., the
plaintiff was more successful. The same dye, Inecto, was involved,
with its name changed to Notox. The suit was brought against the
beauty shop operator rather than the manufacturer, but the opinion
deals more explicitly than the earlier ones with the general question
of foreseeability of injury to allergic users. The plaintiff in this case
had informed the operator that she had trouble ten years earlier with
hair dye and had used only henna since that time. The operator then
advised her that Notox was harmless and applied it to her hair, in
spite of a warning on the package that persons known to have idiosyncrasy to skin and scalp diseases should apply no form of hair
coloring. About two hours after the application the plaintiff's face
became red and swollen. This condition became worse and she lost
nearly all of her hair. In a suit for negligence the plaintiff recovered
$9,500.
In affirming this decision the court distinguished Karr v. Inecto, Inc.
on the ground that there the plaintiff alleged and failed to show that
the dye was inherently poisonous, while in the Arnold case the plaintiff recovered at the trial "not on the theory that the dye was inherently dangerous and poisonous to the skin, but on the theory that the
plaintiff was sensitized, or possessed of an idiosyncrasy to the dye,
which caused her to suffer the injuries complained of, and that the defendant knew or should have known, that the plaintiff was so sensitized." Since there was some notice of this particular plaintiff's
sensitivity to hair dye, the case perhaps is not very significant with
respect to any general duty to warn unknown allergic consumers. The
language quoted, however, does seem to do away with the concept
expressed in several of the earlier cases that only a normal person can
recover, and that the product cannot be regarded as a proximate cause
of the injury to an allergic plaintiff. With reference to negligence, the
court makes the statement that there is liability if a reasonable person
can foresee harm, and significantly adds in that connection that "what
one knows or should know is equivalent in law." This language suggests that liability might have been found even if the plaintiff had not
mentioned her earlier difficulty with hair dye, for it would seem the
defendant should have realized from the warning on the package that
a definite class of persons was sensitive to hair dye. With such knowl65. 337 Mo. 727, 85 S.W.2d 748 (1935).
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edge a failure to pass the warning on would seem to constitute negligence, even with respect to customers who had not reported any
previous trouble.
In Bundy v. Ey-Teb, Inc.,6 another New York case, the plaintiff
recovered in a negligence suit for harm from a preparation used to
dye eyebrows. The Karr decision was not regarded as barring recovery because of testimony by a chemist, who analyzed the product,
that it contained silver nitrate, ammonia and progalic acid, and that
these ingredients "were poisonous, harmful, and dangerous for external use about the human face and especially in or about the eye."
The product had been advertised as containing no poisonous materials
and as harmless to the eyes. There was no testimony as to whether
or not the injury was an allergic one, and this decision, like the one
in the Cahill case, is based on the ground that the product is inherently
dangerous or poisonous, apparently to normal persons. With reference
to proof of negligence the court, following a dictum in the Karr case,
permitted an inference of negligence once the presence of a poisonous
ingredient had been established. The same inference of negligence
was permitted in Petzold v. Roux Laboratories,Inc.,67 after proof that
the hair dye involved was "dangerous or poisonous." It is not clear
from the short opinion in this case whether the court is referring to
the product as poisonous to "normal persons" or to a class of sensitive
users, for here also there was no consideration of whether or not the
plaintiff's injury was an allergic one. In Maher v. Clairol, Inc.,68 another hair dye case, the defendant's position was somewhat improved
by the fact that an instruction sheet urged the making of preliminary
tests before use of the dye. The court nevertheless held that the case
should have been allowed to go to the jury, since a chemist was ready
to testify that the dye was poisonous and inherently dangerous. There
was the additional point that the instructions did not prescribe a test
after an earlier application, as in this case, without harmful results.
There is an English case, Holmes v. Ashord,69 which involves Inecto
hair dye. Instructions enclosed with the dye warned that it might be
dangerous to certain skins and advised that a test be made before use.
A hairdresser who read these instructions nevertheless omitted the
test, and after the dye was applied the plaintiff contracted dermatitis.
The hairdresser admitted liability, and the issue on appeal was
whether or not the defendant manufacturer was negligent. The negligence alleged was failure to give adequate warning of the danger. The
court held that the warning given was sufficient, stating:
66. 160 Misc. 325, 289 N.Y. Supp. 905 (1935).
67. 256 App. Div. 1096, 11 N.Y.S.2d 565 (2d Dep't 1939).

68. 263 App. Div. 848, 31 N.Y.S.2d 751 (2d Dep't 1941).
69. [1950] 2 All E.R. 76 (C.A.).
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Counsel for the plaintiff says they must take reasonable steps to see that
it will come to the notice of any customer. I cannot contemplate any steps
which could be calculated to bring a matter of this kind to the knowledge
of any person who is treated with the preparation. The most that can be
expected of the manufacturers of goods of this kind is to see that the
hairdresser is sufficiently warned.70

It seems clear from this language, together with the fact that almost
the entire opinion is addressed to the adequacy of the warning, that
the plaintiff would have been able to recover if an adequate warning
had not been given, even though her injury was of an allergic character. The warning actually given indicates that the manufacturer had
in mind a definite class of allergic users. The duty to warn in this
situation is more specifically indicated in an earlier English decision,
Parker v. Oloxo, Ltd.,7 1 which also involved a hair dye. The court
there held that an inherently dangerous product was involved, even
though "in the vast majority of cases, the article might be used without
ill effect." It was found that the manufacturer "well knew that Oxolo
might injure anyone whose skin was susceptible to the irritating
agent" contained in the dye, and that under these circumstances it was
negligence to fail to give a warning that "unless a skin test was made,
it was dangerous."7 2 The point that the defendant is obsolved from
liability by an adequate warning is also made in Petzhold v. Roux
73
Laboratories,Inc.
Looking at these earlier hair dye cases as a whole it is evident that

this particular cosmetic is not looked upon with favor by judges, and
that the plaintiff's chances of recovery are good, even though an allergic sort of illness may be involved. While in most of the decisions
for the plaintiff there has been no finding that a sensitive user was
involved, the courts seem quite ready to allow recovery once there has
been testimony that the dye is "poisonous" even though it is evident
that the great mass of users are suffering no ill effects. Probably testimony in these cases that the dye is "poisonous" means simply that it
is harmful to a substantial class of users. This in fact seems to be the
situation judging from the nature of the warning now enclosed with
hair dyes, taken together with their generally harmless use. It should
be noted in this connection that the present Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetics Act requires a clear warning to allergic consumers in the
case of coal tar hair dye.74 These earlier decisions in favor of the
plaintiff do not furnish any direct support, however, for the latest
70. Id. at 80.

71. [1937] 3 All E.R. 524.
72. The court also emphasized the point that it had been represented to an
apprehensive purchaser that the dye was safe.
73. Note 67 supra.

74. See note 3 supra.
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hair dye decision, Braun v. Roux Distrib. Cb.,75 for there a warning
against expectable allergies was given and liability was based on a
failure to give warning of the unique and grave type of allergic injury
which there occurred.
,
There are a number of cases involving soap or detergents where the
allergy issue has been presented. The first of these, Taylor v. Newcomb
Baking Co.,76 involved a suit against an employer based on negligence.
The plaintiff was employed to wash pots and trays in a bakery restaurant. He was supplied with a "strong" soap powder which contained
a trisodium phosphate base, and told how much to use. He developed
serious allergic dermatitis. There was testimony that "quite a percentage" of people are "hypersensitive" to soap powder, and that this
was a matter of common knowledge in the trade. In sustaining a verdict for the plaintiff, the court said: "It is not necessary that the
majority of possible employees be susceptible. It is enough if a sufficient number are susceptible so that a jury could reasonably say that
the defendant ought to have known and recognized the danger of
injury and ought to have guarded against it." This decision is relied
on in the recent case of Wright v. Carter Products, Inc., 7 as establishing the Massachusetts law to the effect that there may be a duty to
be aware of the risk to allergic consumers apart from any statistical
frequency of injury. It seems clear, however, from the above quoted
statement that the duty to know arises only "where a sufficient number
are susceptible." Other language in the opinion emphasizes the fact
that the case involves a "good class people" and an allergy "known to
be common." It may well be, however, that the case represents a
significant development in holding liable a defendant who had no
actual knowledge that other persons previously had suffered from use
8
of the product."
The court was likewise favorable to an allergic plaintiff in an
English case, Board v. Thomas Hedley & Co.,79 where the plaintiff suffered dermatitis of both hands after using Tide. The plaintiff alleged
in a negligence suit against the manufacturer and distributor that the
product was dangerous and the defendant knew or ought to have
known this fact. By means of a discovery procedure the plaintiff
secured an order directing the defendants to reveal all complaints
received up to the time she purchased her carton of Tide. On appeal
it was held that the order should be expanded to cover all complaints
and personal injuries, including those received after the date of the
plaintiff's purchase. It was held that while the subsequent complaints
75. Discussed in text accompanying note 2 supra.
76. 317 Mass. 609, 59 N.E.2d 293 (1945).

77. Discussed in text accompanying note 8 supra.
78. See 51 MciH. L. REv. 447, 448 (1953).
79. [1951] 2 All E.R. 431 (C.A.).
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would not be relevant on the issue of whether the defendant ought to
have known of the danger at the time of the plaintiff's purchase, they
did have a bearing on whether or not the product was in fact dangerous. The court considered that it might be dangerous "if it might
affect normal users adversely, or even if it might adversely affect other
users who had a higher degree of sensitivity than the normal, so long
as they were not altogether exceptional." This case, besides illustrating
the value of discovery procedures to a plaintiff in an allergy case,
clearly indicates that where a class of susceptible users is concerned
there may be liability to other than normal users on negligence
grounds, where there is reason to know of the danger and a failure to
warn.
There is a similar case in California, Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co. v.
Superior Court,80 involving discovery proceedings with reference to
the detergent Cheer. It was claimed that the product contained sodium
alkyl argl sulphonate which caused dermatitis and other illness of the
plaintiff. In a suit based both on negligence and breach of warranty,
the defendant asserted that the injury was due solely "to plaintiff's
physical and bodily condition and constitutional composition." To
refute this defense the plaintiff sought an order directing the defendant
to furnish the names of all persons who had complained of injuries
from Tide or Cheer, alleging on information and belief that Tide and
Cheer were similar in chemical composition. On appeal it was held
that the information need not be furnished because of failure to allege
sufficient facts as to whether the alleged complaints in fact existed,
and as to whether in fact the chemical composition of Tide and of
Cheer were similar, when such information could be obtained by
examination of one of defendant's officers. The opinion makes it
clear, however, that there would be a duty to warn allergic consumers,
stating:
It is settled that if a manufacturer knows or should know that an article
sold by him is dangerous he must give appropriate warning to the user
of a danger which he ordinarily would not discover.... It has been held
that if a seller knows or should know that an article sold by him is dangerous to some persons, even though few in number as compared with the
number of users of the article, he is negligent if he fails to warn the
ignorant of the hidden danger.81

The court regards this duty to warn as arising whether the action is
based on negligence or on breach of warranty. 82
Before leaving the negligence cases mention should be made of an
80. 124 Cal. App. 2d 157, 268 P.2d 199 (1954).
81. 268 P.2d at 202.
82. A case involving Tide based solely on breach of warranty, Worley v.
Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., is discussed in textual matter to note 97 infra.
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employer's liability case, Evinger v. Thompson,83 brought under the
federal act, where the court finds a duty to foresee an injury to a class
and give appropriate warning. The employee sued on account of
chrome dermatitis caused by contact with sodium bicarbonate used
by the defendant as a rust inhibitor in the cooling systems of its diesel
engines. The plaintiff's doctor testified that from twenty to twentyseven per cent of the persons exposed to sodium bicarbonate were
affected by it, and even the defendant's witness testified that about
two per cent were sensitive. Furthermore the plaintiff offered to prove
that other employees, working with him on the diesels, had suffered
from the same kind of dermatitis. After pointing out that the defendant had not been warned of any danger, the court affirmed a
judgment for the plaintiff, with a remittitur to $25,000, stating:
In any event, the evidence of experience in other industries at least
showed that a very substantial per cent of those exposed to chrome compounds would be affected; and if defendant could reasonably foresee that
a considerable number of its employees would be so affected, it would
have the duty to exercise due care to prevent such injury. This principle
has been applied in cases of liability of a manufacturer or seller to persons
unusually susceptible to harm from the article or substance sold.84
The court further stated that the jury could find negligence on the
basis either of actual or constructive knowledge. It appeared that this
was the first case of dermatitis after the defendant began the use of
sodium bicarbonate, but in view of testimony that chrome dermatitis
had been understood in medical circles for a long time, and the evidence about the high incidence of sensitivity, the case seems a strong
one for imposing a duty to warn the very considerable class of susceptible persons there involved.
When we look at these cases where a class of allergic users is involved as a whole, it seems clear that the courts are quite likely to
permit a finding that a defendant who fails to warn of the possibility
of harm may be guilty of negligence. The size of the class may in
some cases be quite small. So in Wright v. Carter Products, Inc., the
percentage of persons sensitive to the deodorant which injured the
plaintiff was far less than one per cent, but it nevertheless was found
that a duty to warn might arise, in view of the defendant's knowledge
as an expert. In Gerkin v. Brown & Sehler Co., the decision most
frequently relied on where the court finds for the allergic plaintiff, one
per cent of the users were affected by the dyed fur there involved. In
the hair dye cases prior to the Braun case there are no clear statements
that even a class of allergic users must be warned, but several of the
holdings suggest that there is a duty to warn the substantial class
83. 364 Mo. 658, 265 S.W.2d 726 (1954).
84. 265 S.W.2d at 732.
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which is in fact allergic to this product, and it is clear that allergic
consumers of coal tar hair and dyes must be warned under the Federal
Pure Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act.85 The detergent cases seem to
impose a duty to warn allergic consumers, with no indication, however, of the size of the class. The net result appears to be that whenever the plaintiff can show that his allergy is not of an isolated or
exceptional character, he has a fair chance of recovery on negligence
grounds where the defendant has failed to give warning. Where,
however, the size of the class is quite small, as in the Wright case, the
plaintiff may need to buttress his case with testimony concerning the
availability to the defendant of expert knowledge. On the other hand
if a large percentage of sensitive users can be established, this factor
alone is likely to give rise to the duty to warn, particularly if the harm
likely to be suffered is of a serious kind.
Warranty-SusceptibleClass
The warranty cases in which the plaintiff is able to establish that a
class of users is involved are much less numerous than the negligence
ones. As indicated in the discussion of warranty cases involving isolated injuries, many of the earlier cases seem to regard even a class of
allergic users as outside of the scope of the warranty, and unable to
recover in the absence of evidence that the product is harmful to
normal persons. In a few of the modern cases, however, the courts
have found that a breach of warranty does occur when there is a
failure to warn a recognized class.
Two cases decided in 1939, both involving aniline dyes, apparently
are the first ones recognizing this new duty.8 The first of these decisions, Zirpola v. Adam Hat Stores, Inc.,87 arose in New Jersey, and
the other, Bianchi v. Denholm & McKay Co.,88 was decided the same
year in Massachusetts. The Zirpola case involved a hat band "impregnated by dye known as paraphenylene-diamine, an aniline derivative,"
which was alleged to be of a poisonous nature. A few weeks after the
plaintiff purchased the hat from one of defendant's stores, his black
hair turned reddish-orange on each side of his head, and he experienced a skin eruption on his forehead and scalp. It was asserted that
this condition was caused by the dye in the sweat band of the hat, and
85. See note 3 supra.
86. There is a statement favoring recovery on warranty grounds in the
earlier case of Smith v. Denholm & McKay Co., 288 Mass. 234, 192 N.E. 631
(1934), but the product there involved, a hair remover containing thallium
acetate, was proved harmful to a normal person. That being the case, it was
indicated that plaintiff could recover for the whole injury even though the
harm was accentuated by the plaintiff's susceptibility. This is the generally
accepted rule in such cases, where the injury is simply aggravated by a preexisting infirmity. See DICKERSON, PRODUCTS
SUMER 212 (1951).
87. 122 N.J.L. 29, 4 A.2d 73 (1939).
88. 302 Mass. 469, 19 N.E.2d 697 (1939).
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suit was brought for breach of the implied warranty of fitness. There
was considerable evidence that four or five per cent of all persons
coming in contact with the dye would be injured by it, along with
testimony that the dye was forbidden by law in some states, and that
"all persons are somewhat sensitive to the poison." There also was
evidence, apparently uncontradicted, that the plaintiff was "abnormally sensitive." In affirming a judgment for the plaintiff the court
made the following significant statement with regard to the defense
of allergy:
The mere fact that only a small proportion of those who use a certain
article would suffer injuries by reason of. such use does not absolve the
vendor from liability under the implied warranty created by the statute;
otherwise, in every action to recover damages for the breach of an implied
warranty, it would be necessary to show that the article sold, whether it
be food or wearing apparel, would be injurious to every user. It is well
known that many people are immune from certain poisons as well as contagious and infectious diseases, yet it could not be contended by reason
thereof that a vendor selling an article infected with disease germs or
containing a poisonous substance injurious to the user of the article would
not be liable under an implied warranty, unless it could be proved that
injury would be the inevitable result of the use of such article.8 9
It is evident from the above passage that the court is not relying on
testimony that the dye is somewhat harmful to all persons, but is
regarding the dye as "poisonous" if it will injuriously affect what is
referred to as a "small proportion" of the users. While it appeared in
this case that quite a substantial percentage of users were sensitive to
the dye, the language suggests that the result would be the same even
though a lesser proportion of allergic users had been involved. Nothing
is said in the opinion about a duty to warn, and it is likely that the
court regarded the dye used as sufficiently dangerous so that it should
be eliminated. It is significant that the opinion assumes that the dye
may be regarded as the proximate cause of the harm, even though the
plaintiff was abnormally sensitive. The plaintiff recovered only the
modest amount of $200, but obtained what seems to be the first decision
in favor of an allergic plaintiff in an action for breach of warranty.
A similar approach was adopted by the Massachusetts court in the
Bianchi case, where the aniline dyes were contained in a face powder
purchased from the defendant. It appears from the opinion that aniline
dyes are commonly used and "do not irritate the average person," but
that the dyes "are irritants to some people in the sense that their
skins have a sensitiveness which is medically known as an 'allergic'
condition." The plaintiff was found to be one of this allergic class, "not
defined as to numbers or percentage." It was found that the applica89. 4 A.2d 73, 75 (1939).
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tion of the powder to the plaintiff's face caused dermatitis on the side
of her face.
The court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff, sustaining a refusal
to charge that the implied warranty of fitness, on which the suit was
based, would not extend to matters "wholly unknown to the dealer
and peculiar to the individual buyer." In that connection the court
stated:
If the words "peculiar to the individual buyer" ... are intended to apply
to the plaintiff as the only person who would be injuriously affected, or
if it was intended to exclude the existence of a class of "peculiar" persons
and there was evidence to support findings in these respects, that would
be one thing. But the evidence is not so restrictive.... We do not think
that a seller of face powder containing a known irritant to "some" persons'
skins can be heard to say that he is not liable for a breach of implied
warranty of fitness where injury results from a use of the powder by one
such as is described by the evidence in the case at bar.90
The court indicates that it does not intend to pass on the question of
whether allergic users of "harmless and non-dangerous substances
such as strawberries, eggs, or other products in common use" can recover for a breach of warranty. It would seem that there would be
no recovery in these "strawberry" and "egg" cases even though a
definite class of allergic users is involved, on the ground that the
buyer may be charged with common knowledge that many persons
are allergic to these products, with the result that there is no duty to
warn, even though the particular buyer may not realize the risk.0 1
One writer states in this connection, "Even if a specific food allergent
is found to be both widespread and serious, responsibility should not
be imposed on the producer unless the court also finds that the consumers-in general-of the product lack knowledge of the allergy
problem which it is practicable for producers-in general-of the
product to give them, and, without it, lack the reasonable opportunity
to avoid the injury."92 The situation seems much like that where the
consumer of creamed chicken is held to a normal expectation that it
may contain bones.9
There is a later New Jersey case, Reynolds v. Sun Ray Drug Co.,.4
in which the plaintiff recovered on warranty grounds for injuries from
lipstick. The opinion is quite brief, with no indication of what
the offending element was, or how many persons were likely to suffer
a harmful reaction from the product. The allergy issue was clearly
90. 19 N.E.2d 697, 699 (1939).
91. Horowitz, Allergy of the Plaintiff as a Defense in Action Based on Breach
of Implied Warranty of Quality, 24 So. CAL. L. REv. 221, 236 (1951).
92. DICKERSON, PRoDucTs LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER 228

(1951).

93. Goodwin v. Country Club of Peoria, 323 Ill. App. 1, 54 N.E.2d 612 (1944);

DICKERSON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER 186 (1951).

94. 135 N.J.L. 475, 52 A.2d 666 (1947).

19591

ALLERGIC USERS OF PRODUCTS

raised, however, by the defendant's request for instruction that the
implied warranty of fitness was not applicable "when only a small
proportion of those who use a certain article are injuriously affected
thereby." The court refused to give this instruction, relying on the
Zirpola and Bianchi decisions. The defendant attempted to distinguish
the Zirpola decision on the ground that the defendant there involved
was also a manufacturer who might be charged with knowledge of
the ingredients used in this product, while this defendant was a retailer, selling the product in a sealed container not open to inspection.
The court, however, regarded this factor as immaterial in a warranty
action. As remarked in a standard treatise, the state of the particular
seller's knowledge in the situation does not seem relevant, for the
"inquiry into scienter is here an inquiry into negligence, and liability
for breach of warranty is strict. '9 5 On the other hand, it is evident
that the courts, in limiting recovery to situations where a class of susceptible users are involved, do consider that some general knowledge
of consumer reactions is essential to liability on warranty grounds.9
9
There is one recent case, Worley v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 7
which runs counter to the tendency in the cases just considered to find
that a class of allergic plaintiffs may be within the scope of the warranty. The plaintiff there involved contracted dermatitis after using
Tide for washing dishes. The court found, contrary to the usual view
in the case of general products, that the plaintiff's case did not fail for
lack of privity. It was concluded, however, that there was no evidence
of breach of the warranty, because the plaintiff failed to produce any
testimony that the product was "in any way detrimental or injurious
to the skin of normal persons" and did not point out any specific
"deleterious substance." Apparently it would not have helped the
plaintiff to point out a substance injurious to an allergic class, for the
court states, "The scope of the warranty in question is limited, as appellant contends, to the absence in preparation in question of ingredients injurious to the skin of normal persons using the soap in
normal manner, and the burden was upon plaintiff to bring herself
within the class contemplated." This language is reminiscent of that
in the cases decided prior to the Zirpola and Bianchi decisions. On the
other hand the language of the California case involving Tide, Proctor
& Gamble Mfg. Co. v. Superior Court,98 contains a clear dictum in
(1956).
96. There is an earlier lipstick case, Smith v. Burdine's, Inc., 144 Fla. 500,
198 So. 223 (1940), where the testimony suggests that "hypersensitivity" was
involved. The implied warranty of fitness was held to be applicable, but
there was no discussion of the allergy issue, which apparently was not raised.
95. 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1581

The court refers to the lipstick as containing a "poisonous substance" and

apparently it was found to be harmful to normal persons.
97. 253 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. App. 1953).
98. Discussed in text accompanying note 80 supra.
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favor of liability to an allergic class on warranty as well as negligence
grounds.
CONCLUSIONS

Warranty: Looking at the warranty cases as a whole, it appears that
there is a distinct trend toward allowing recovery on warranty grounds
where the plaintiff can point to a definite class of allergic users, with
clear holdings to this effect in New Jersey and Massachusetts. In a
number of other jurisdictions there are statements that only normal
persons are within the scope of the warranty, but in most of those
cases the court seems to have been considering an isolated sensitivity
rather than an allergic class, and it is not at all clear that these dicta
would be followed in a case involving a definite class.
The warranty cases permitting recovery indicate very little about
the size of the class, since the only actual figures involved are the four
or five per cent of susceptible users involved in the Zirpola decision.
In view of the fact that the liability imposed under warranty doctrines
is a strict one, without reference to any ability on the part of the defendant to know of the danger, it may well be that recovery would
not be extended to groups as small as those which have been protected
in some of the negligence cases. For example, the decision in Wright
v. Carter Products,Inc., involving the deodorant to which far less than
one per cent of the users were sensitive, might well have been for the
defendant if the suit had been based on warranty rather than on
negligence grounds. A leading treatise states in connection with
warranty liability that while a defendant should "not be held as an
insurer against illness from his products" there should be liability
"where medical men can point to a definite pattern of allergy which
the court is willing to call unreasonably dangerous." 99 The Zirpola
and Bianchi cases indicate that this point may be reached by a court
when "a small proportion" or "some" of the users are affected. Doubtless, as in the negligence field, the gravity of the harm threatened and
the practicality of giving a warning will influence the courts in determining whether or not the danger is sufficient to bring the plaintiff's
injury within the scope of the warranty. The theory on which a duty
to warn can be imposed in warranty cases is that the goods are legally
defective unless an adequate warning is given, in those cases where
it is known to the experts in science, or in the industry concerned,
that a significant group will suffer substantial harm unless warned. 100
Where this general awareness of the danger is present, the knowledge,
or means of knowledge of the particular seller would not be essential
99. 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1586 (1956).
100. DICKERSON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER

217, 226 (1951).
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to liability, for the responsibility for breach of warranty is a strict one,
not based on scienter or fault.10 1
Where the plaintiff's sensitivity appears to be peculiar to himself
there is practically no authority that the harm suffered is within the
scope of the warranty. This is the conclusion generally arrived at even
by those favorable to recovery by allergic plaintiffs. 102 The only case
03
which seems to hold otherwise is the Zampino decision.
Negligence: Where the plaintiff's sensitivity is unique his chances
of recovery are no greater in a negligence suit than when he bases his
action on breach of warranty. The only decision which seems to hold
otherwise, Braun v. Roux Distrib.Co, seems out of harmony both with
the earlier decisions and with general negligence principles.
Where it appears that a recognizable class of allergic use is involved it is evident that since the Gerkin decision in 1913 a clear majority of the courts which have considered the problem have found
that a duty to warn may arise. Often there is uncertainty as to the
size of the class, since the decisions allowing recovery seldom indicate
percentage of allergic users involved. If the viewpoint expressed in
the recent case of Wright v. Carter Products,Inc. is followed, the emphasis will be placed in the future not so much on statistical frequency
of injury as on such matters as the availability of scientific information,
the gravity of the harm threatened, and the practicability of giving an
effective warning.
Burden of Proof: The important matter of what the plaintiff must
prove in order to recover is not entirely clear from the cases. There is
considerable authority that the plaintiff will be presumed to be normal,
and that the burden is on the defendant to show that the injury resulted from the plaintiff's peculiar sensitivity. It quite often appears,
however, from the examination of the plaintiff's own physician that
plaintiff's injury is one of an allergic character. Where that is the
situation the courts which permit recovery ordinarily require that
the plaintiff point out the offending element in the product and show
that this is harmful to a class of users. The harmful character of the
ingredient involved can be shown by proof that similar injuries have
occurred to others, or expert testimony that the ingredient is known
04
to produce harmful results to a recognizable group.
Contributory Fault: Ordinarily if the case is one where the court
finds a duty to warn, this duty is based on the consideration that the
101. See note 95 supra.
102. See 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1586 (1956); Horowitz,
Allergy of the Plaintiff as a Defense in Action Based upon Breach of Implied
Warranty of Quality, 24 So. CAL. L. REv. 221, 234 (1951).
103. Discussed in text accompanying note 53 supra.
104. For a good discussion of the problems of proof see Note, 5 VAND. L. REV.
212, 218 (1952).
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supplier of the product knows or should know that there is an ingredient in the product which can be expected to cause harm to a class of
consumers. On the other hand the user of the product, as pointed out
in the Wright case, ordinarily does not know what substance the
product contains. Where the plaintiff is in this unfavorable position
the issues of contributory negligence and voluntary assumption of
-risk are not likely to arise.105 If, however, the plaintiff clearly knows
of the danger from an independent source, or from his own previous
experience with the product, he may well be barred from recovery by
his own conduct, even though there has been a failure to warn allergic
consumers generally.
A warning is of course particularly appropriate where the nature
of the product permits reasonable tests prior to its use. Where the
sensitivity of the user cannot be discovered in advance the warning
is of much less value. It is likely, for example, that the plaintiff
in the Braun case would have used the hair dye even if the warning
which the court required had been given, since she would not have
realized her susceptibility to the rare allergic disease there involved.
In many cases, however, the user will realize that he is sensitive to a
good many substances, and he may well avoid products which contain
a clear warning to the allergic.
It would seem that the development of the duty to warn allergic
consumers which has been described is a reasonable one. Of course
the defendant has done nothing wrong in manufacturing or selling a
product which normal persons find satisfactory, and he should not be
expected to please the abnormal few at the expense of the normal
many. The obligation, however, is not to remove the offending ingredient, but simply to give an appropriate warning that it can be expected to cause harm to a class of users. The imposition of a duty
under these circumstances is in accord with generally accepted negligence principles, and does not seem to involve any undue expansion
of liability for breach of warranty.
105. See Dillard and Hart, Product Liability: Directions for Use and the
Duty to Warn, 41 VA. L. REv. 145, 163 (1955).

